In "A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition" David Chalmers articulates, justifies and defends the computational suf ficiency thesis (CST). Chalmers advances a revised theory of computational implementation, and argues that implementing the right sort of computational structure is sufficient for the possession of a mind, and for the possession of a wide variety of mental properties. I argue that Chalmers's theory of implementation is consistent with the nomological possibility of physical systems that possess different entire minds. I further argue that this brain-possessing-two-minds result challenges CST in three ways. It implicates CST with a host of epistemological problems; it undermines the underlying assumption that the mental supervenes on the physical; and it calls into question the claim that CST provides conceptual foundations for the computational science of the mind.
Introduction
In "A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition" (forthcoming) David Chalmers articulates, justifies and defends the computational suf ficiency thesis (CST). CST states that "the right kind of computational *I am grateful to Darren Abramson, Matthias Scheutz, Eli Dresner, and three anonymous referees of this Journal, for their comments, suggestions and corrections. This research was supported by The Israel Science Foundation, grant 1509/11. (Putnam 1988; Searle 1992) . These claims appear to challenge CST: If every physical system implements every computational structure, then (if CST is true) every physical system implements the computational structure that suffices for cognition ("a possession of a mind"). Hence, every physical system is a cognitive system. In other words, if CST is true then rocks, chairs and planets have the same kind of cognition that we do Chalmers argues, however, that the antecedent of the first conditional (i.e., universal implementation) is false; he offers instead a theory of implementation that avoids the pitfalls of universal implementation.
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My aim here is to argue that Chalmers's theory of implementation does not block a different challenge to CST. The challenge, roughly, is that some possible physical systems simultaneously implement different computational structures (or different states of the same computational structure) that suffice for cognition; hence these systems simultaneously possess different minds. Chalmers admits this possibility elsewhere (1996) . But I argue that it is more than just a remote, implausible scenario, and that it renders CST less plausible.
Chalmers writes that by justifying CST "we can see that the foundations of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science are solid." I wish to emphasize that my argument against CST is not meant to undermine in any way the prospects of the theoretical work in brain and cognitive sciences.
1 My conclusion, rather, is that CST is not the way to construe the conceptual foundations of computational brain and cognitive sciences. While I do not offer here an alternative conceptual account, I have outlined one elsewhere (Shagrir 2006; 2010) , and intend to develop it in greater detail in future.
The paper has three parts. In the next section I discuss the notion of
